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Challenging the Sovereign:  







The fact that the term ‘federation’ in the social sciences is conceptually identified with 
the federal state (see, e.g.: Davis 1978; Elazar 1987; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011; 
Watts 1998) is a symptom of a broader issue diagnosed by Jean L. Cohen as the domi-
nation of the statist paradigm in the academic treatment of federalism (cf. Cohen 2012, 
11, 82). Accordingly, the studies of federalism are either treated within the context of 
the internal ordering of a state (here the concept of the federal state is in focus) or within 
the realm of international relations (here confederal treaty organizations of states are of 
interest).1 This state-centered focus reduces federalism to the administrative issue of the 
degree of centralization or a mere international agreement. More importantly, it ob-
scures the fact that the political form of the modern federation and corresponding feder-
al theories2 emerged in early modern Europe as a response to the crisis of the pre-
Westphalian international order and as an alternative to the state and corresponding the-
ories of sovereignty. (Cohen 2012, 88; Riley 1976, 18; Spruyt 1996; Forsyth 1981)3  
                                                
*Academic work is never an individual enterprise. I owe my thanks to my departmental 
colleagues Sara Gebh and Peter Galambos whose comments helped to improve this pa-
per. I also want to thank an anonymous reviewer for their challenging questions, re-
marks, and comments. I am also grateful Manuela Badilla Rajevic for her last look at 
the paper.  
1 E.g.: Carl J. Friedrich operates with this dualism in his treatment of federal theories and practices 
(Friedrich 1968); in his analysis of ancient leagues, Edward Freeman compares them to the US federal 
model (Freeman 1893); Patrick Riley assesses early modern theories of federalism according to their 
conformity to the form of the federal state (Riley 1976). 
2 In this paper I treat political theories (whether of federalism or sovereignty) as a form of political 
practice. 
3 Even American federation, considered a paradigmatic example of a federal state, was initially 
established as an alternative to the political form of the state. (Cohen 2012, Forsyth 1981) 
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Certain scholars, most notably Carl Schmitt (2008), Murray Forsyth (1981), and Jean 
Cohen (2012), distinguish the federation form the federal state on the one hand and 
from the mere treaty-based international alliance on the other. Forsyth calls the federa-
tion (or, in his terminology: the federal union) “a union of states in a body politic”. 
(Forsyth 1981, 7) For Schmitt, the federation is a “a permanent association … through 
which the comprehensive status of each individual federation member in political terms 
is changed in regard to the common goals.” (Schmitt 2008, 383–384) In Cohen's words, 
the federation is a “political and legal form for non-state composite polities that bridge 
the domestic/international divide without renouncing the discourse of sovereignty for 
member states and which are not imperial formations.” (Cohen 2012, 82) Although mo-
tivated by different normative and political concerns,4 all three scholars have acknowl-
edged that federal unions/federations are sui generis constitutional political forms. The 
aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on federalism and federations beyond the 
statist paradigm. In contrast to these three authors, however, I do not attempt to offer a 
general theory of the federation. Rather, my aim is to present the variety of early mod-
ern federal theories as alternatives to the modern state and state sovereignty, grouped in 
three ideal types, and highlight significance of these differences. 
      The formation of the state proceeded through simultaneous centralization of power 
by eliminating internal competitors by aspiring princes on the one hand, and emancipa-
tion from the universal authorities of the Empire and Papacy on the other. This process 
was accompanied by the development of the absolutist Bodinian-Hobbesian theory of 
sovereignty. The effects of this process were 1) a threat to autonomy of sub-state units 
as a result of progressive development of organ sovereignty; 2) unstable international 
environment with constant possibility of war and resulting threat to security and surviv-
al of units (in particular small units); and 3) the disempowerment of the population as a 
correlate of the empowerment of the sovereign organ.  
                                                
4 Carl Schmitt dismisses the federation as a political form plagued by internal contradictions and for 
this reason only a transitory form between either larger state or multiplicity of states. Jean Cohen, by 
contrast, sees in the federal union a possible and desirable answer to the contemporary challenges to state 
sovereignty posed by the processes of globalization. Forsyth, on his part, is mostly concerned with 
demonstrating its distinctiveness from the state and treaty-based organizations of states. 
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The criterion for the classification is the effect that the theories respond to.5 The first 
ideal type (for the purposes of this paper named sovereignty relativizing federalism) 
consists of de-absolutization of organ sovereignty by means of introducing territorial 
intermediary bodies mediating between subjects and central power (internal de-
absolutization), or subjecting the central authority to external higher power in order to 
provide avenues for appeals of sovereign's decisions (external de-absolutization). The 
second ideal type, concerned with the security in the international system, pools sover-
eignty (hence sovereignty pooling federalism) in a form of defensive or pacific federa-
tion in order to constitutionalize relations among states. The third type, developed to-
gether with the justifications of the right to rebellion,6 redefines sovereign power as 
power to constitute common authority and locates it in the collective body of the peo-
ple; importantly, the act of constitution is understood as consensual coming together of 
territorial communities (hence bottom-up federalism). Additionally, these three ideal 
types also differ in regard to the criteria of evaluation for federal arrangements and 
normative implications of each of the types. 
      The argument of the paper proceeds as follows. In the first section I present the pro-
cess of the formation of the state and the three effects to which theories of federalism 
responded: the rise of organ sovereignty, competitive geopolitical environment gov-
erned by the imperative of size, and the emergence of the state as independent from so-
ciety. In the following three sections I present the three ideal types. In the concluding 
section, I draw implications for our thinking about federalism.  
 
 
                                                
5 A note on the selection of authors: Given the aim of the paper, I will limit myself to early modern 
European authors, disregarding the American contribution to federal theory as well as theories developed 
around and after the French Revolution in Europe. For reasons of limited space I concentrate on two aut-
hors per type who contribute most to my argument. The first ideal type will be discussed through Mon-
tesquieu and Leibniz, the second one through Pufendorf and Rousseau, and the third one through Ste-
phanus Junius Brutus, the Celt1 and Johannes Althusius. ‘Stephanus Junius Brutus, the Celt’ is a pseudo-
nym of a French author of Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos. Although the tract is most often attributed to Phi-
lip Mornay there is no definitive proof. 
6 It is common to attribute the invention of the concept of constituent power to Emmanuel-Joseph 
Sieyes. Nonetheless, although it is true the term ‘pouvoir constituant’ was used for the first time most 
probably by him, already in 1660 George Lawson wrote of the “power to constitute.” (Lawson 1993, 47) 
Moreover, the distinction between the constituting and the constituted and the implication of the superio-
rity of the former over the latter is present in the writings of the Monarchomachs and the logic of this 
distinction can be traced as early as the first half of the fourteenth century when it appears in the writings 
of Marsilius of Padua. (see: Kalyvas 2013)  
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The rise of the state and state sovereignty 
The formation of states and the corresponding theories of sovereignty were institutional 
and theoretical responses to the decline of the Medieval European political order of 
Respublica Christiana. This medieval order rested on a complex hierarchy of personal 
obligations between princes and nobles in which personal privileges and land ownership 
were the basis of public right. The apex of this hierarchy were the Pope and the Emper-
or, the ecclesiastical and temporal heads of the order, respectively, as powers claiming 
universal authority. (e.g. Poggi 1978; Philpott 1995, 360–361) This essentially creedal 
unity of Respublica Christiana was undermined by the Reformation. The religion-based 
universal authority of the Pope was questioned. Doctrinal differences antagonized hold-
ers of public powers and resulted in what Carl Schmitt has called European civil wars 
(Schmitt 2006). 
      The modern state and the corresponding concept of sovereignty was a response to 
the resulting social disorder. (Hinsley 1986, 126) The process of state making, as shown 
by Charles Tilly, proceeded through the centralization of power in the hands of the 
monarch and entailed the gradual elimination of autonomous seats of power and their 
military capacity within the claimed territory. (Tilly 1985) This monopolization of vio-
lence was supplemented by the creation of the bureaucratic apparatus capable of extract-
ing resources necessary for this struggle without relying on local magnates as agents. In 
short, this process signified the dismantling of the intermediary bodies mediating be-
tween the central ruler and the subjects.  
      Absolutist theories of sovereignty were developed most notably by Jean Bodin and 
Thomas Hobbes to give this process ideological justification and theoretical legitimacy7. 
Bodin defines sovereignty as “the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth… 
– that is, the highest power of command.” (Bodin 1992, 1) Hobbes (Hobbes 1996) 
adopted this definition but liberated the power of sovereignty from constitutional and 
divine law constraints, still present in Bodin's theory, effectively making the sovereign 
power “unlimited, illimitable, irresponsible and omnipotent”. (Hinsley 1986, 143) This 
difference aside, for both of them sovereignty is necessarily vested in the supreme organ 
                                                
7 While analytically distinguishable, the formation of absolute monarchies and the formation of 
states in Early modern Europe were historically interrelated processes. For this reason, I treat them here 
together. 
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of the state and is independent from the collectivity over which it rules. (see: Skinner 
1989, 2002) It is repressive, commanding, and top-down. (Kalyvas 2005, 226–227) 
Consequently, not only the validity of all laws, including customary laws, within a terri-
tory but also the existence of all other institutions and possible autonomous loci of pow-
er between the sovereign and individual subjects is dependent on the sovereign's will. 
      This internal sovereignty is logically related to external sovereignty understood as 
independence. According to both Bodin and Hobbes, sovereignty also means imperme-
ability to external jurisdictional claims. This effectively transposed the Hobbesian state 
of nature from the relations between individuals to the relations between states. The 
sovereign cannot be bound by law and any self-limitation is completely voluntary and 
can be terminated at will. In practical terms, external sovereignty meant jus belli and the 
‘right’ to participate in international treaty making as equal with other sovereigns. (see: 
Cohen 2012, 26) In other words, while absolutist sovereignty was used to justify con-
centration of power as the sine qua non of internal order, it created unstable external 
environment. Moreover, as the distinction between the internal and external was not as 
clear at the threshold of the modern age, rulers attempting to centralize power perceived 
other princes as competitors in their quest for the monopoly of violence over a territory 
whereby the logic of ‘internal pacification’ extended into the logic of war. As Tilly con-
cisely put it, “In these circumstances, war became the normal condition of the interna-
tional system of states and the normal means of defending or enhancing a position with-
in the system of states” (Tilly 1985, 184).  
      This process of state formation in Europe had three important effects already at the 
threshold of political modernity. The first effect is the gradual establishment of state 
sovereignty understood as organ sovereignty. This effect has its internal and external 
facets. Internally, it is associated with the elimination of the bodies capable of mediating 
between the sovereign and subjects and possibly moderating the impact the former had 
over the latter. Externally, by instituting the sovereign as the ultimate decision-maker, it 
eliminates any avenues for appeal against the decisions of the sovereign organ. The se-
cond effect is the normalization of war and conquest as a tool of state formation. The 
threat of war in the nascent state system could be averted only by preventive strikes or 
by deterrence of potential competitors. Given such competitive geopolitical environ-
ment and the related imperative of size, small polities are particularly threatened and 
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vulnerable. The third effect is the emergence of the state, both as a concept and in prac-
tice, as the pacifier of social conflicts, independent from the society over which it exer-
cises power. Crucially, the legitimacy of the state is not grounded in the community 
over which it rules but from its quality as sovereign, making any kind of resistance a 
priori illegitimate. 
      It is important to note that the absolutist state sovereignty was not a description of 
reality at the threshold of political modernity. (Vincent 1987, 75) Rather, it formed the 
theoretical and ideological basis for the absolutist state formation. The sovereign mod-
ern state was invented before it was implemented. (Ruggie 1993, 166) It was forged in 
ideological, political, and military struggles with competing ideas regarding the organi-
zation of political power, federal ideas in particular. In what follows, I present three 
(ideal) types of early modern federal theory as responses to these three effects.  
 
Challenging Organ Sovereignty: Sovereignty Relativizing Federalism 
The absolute quality of emerging state sovereignty and its location at the apex of state 
power (organ sovereignty) had the internal effect of a gradual elimination of intermedi-
ary bodies as autonomous loci of power and the external effect of making the state im-
permeable for jurisdictional claims from without. It subjects individuals directly to the 
power of the sovereign on the one hand, and makes the decisions of the sovereign ulti-
mate and unappealable. In response to these interrelated effects (for the purpose of clas-
sification taken as one combined effect), federal theory drew on the medieval and pre-
modern experience to postulate the desirability of intermediary bodies and undermine 
the necessity of the absolute quality of sovereignty. To illustrate the former, I discuss 
federal elements in Montesquieu's discussion of the monarchy and Gothic constitution-
alism; to reflect on the latter I turn to the work of Leibniz. 
      Centralization of power, particularly the one in France under Bourbons, had for 
Montesquieu despotic potential and features. (e.g.: Montesquieu 1989, 5.10.56)8 The 
reason for this was that since in monarchy “the prince is the source of all political and 
civil power,” (Montesquieu 1989, 1.4.17) it requires a class of nobles with their status-
based privileges and organized in mediating bodies like parliaments to prevent this form 
                                                
8 References to Montesquieu should be read as follows: [book].[chapter].[page number]. 
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of government from degenerating into despotic rule. The English, who also abolished 
privileges of the nobles, were nonetheless able to maintain their liberty only because 
their constitution was in fact republican under the guise of monarchy. (see: Montesquieu 
1989, 5.19.70) Yet, despite Montesquieu's admiration for the separation of powers in 
the English system, he notes that if the English were to lose their liberty, “they would be 
one of the most enslaved peoples on earth.” (Montesquieu 1989, 2.4.19) Thus, in spite 
of the separation of powers, the English system of parliamentary sovereignty carried a 
potential for despotism as it depended on a precarious balance between the Parliament 
and the monarch (see: Mosher 2000, 180–181).  
      Both French absolutism and English parliamentary sovereignty were successors of 
Gothic constitutions which, according to Montesquieu, were “the best kind of govern-
ment men have been able to device.” (Montesquieu 1989, 11.8.168) As Lee Ward ar-
gues, Montesquieu saw elements of Gothic constitutionalism as capable of mitigating 
the potential for despotism even in the English constitution. (Ward 2007)9 The Gothic 
constitution of the French kingdom consisted of three main elements. The first element 
is that it encompassed a multiplicity of groups who were connected with the monarch 
through reciprocal rights, retained their significant autonomy within the kingdom, and 
even participated in the election of the ruler. The second is that the local hereditary no-
bles gathered in provincial assemblies and were entrusted with codification and imple-
mentation of provincial laws. As Ward notes, “[t]he impact of this institution was to 
structure the French legal system on the basis of overlapping and conjoint jurisdictions 
in which the crown and the nobility, the center and the regions shared power.” (Ward 
2007, 566) The third element is the organization of local powers into institutions medi-
ating and buffering royal power. (Ward 2007, 567) In his rooting of these three ele-
ments in the privileges of nobility, Montesquieu assumed a reactionary position defend-
ing the aristocratic prerogatives against the centralizing absolutist monarchy. (see: Al-
thusser 2007) Nonetheless, to the extent that the elements of Gothic constitutionalism 
can be understood also as legal pluralism, territorial division of power, and intermediary 
powers with legitimate standing independent from central authority (rather than just 
                                                
9 In this section I am very indebted to Lee Ward's illuminating and ingenious interpretation. Accor-
ding to Ward, Montesquieu's main contribution to federal theory is not to be found in the short discussion 
of the federal republic (Book 9, Chapters 1-3 in The Spirit of the Laws), but in his discussion of the 
Gothic constitution of the French kingdom. In this respect, I do not claim originality. 
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layers of status-based social orders) it resembles modern federalism as self- and shared 
rule. 
      Leibniz applies similar logic of de-absolutization of sovereignty to external rela-
tions. Refuting Hobbes, Leibniz denies the reality of the absolutist conception of sover-
eignty by stating that it empirically does not exist “neither among civilized peoples not 
among barbarians”. (Leibniz 1988a, 120) Rather, sovereignty, according to him, proper-
ly means “territorial supremacy” or “territorial hegemony”. Internally, the mark of sov-
ereignty is the coercive power “readied not against a few stubborn persons, but against 
an entire community” (Leibniz 1988a, 115) in order to compel subjects to perform their 
duties owed to the territorial lord. Nonetheless, this supremacy in relation to subjects 
does not exclude limitations on what the sovereign can legitimately demand from them. 
(Leibniz 1988a, 116) Externally, the mark of sovereignty is freedom from external tute-
lage and the capacity to engage in international politics: “Those are counted among sov-
ereign powers, then, and are held to possess sovereignty, who can count on sufficient 
freedom and power to exercise some influence in international affairs, with armies or by 
treaties.” (Leibniz 1988b, 175) Just as in the case of internal sovereignty, it does not 
imply absolute power as the one who is considered sovereign “may perhaps be limited 
by the bonds of obligation toward a superior and owe him homage, fidelity and obedi-
ence” (Leibniz 1988b, 175).  
      This relativization of sovereignty allows Leibniz to develop the concept of a union 
of states as a body that cannot be reduced to the sum of its members: “it is necessary 
that a certain administration be formed, with some power over the members; which 
power obtains as a matter of ordinary right, in matters of greater moment, and those 
which concern the public welfare. Here I say there exists a state.” (Leibniz 1988a, 117). 
For Leibniz, the Germanic Empire is an example of such a union where the majesty of 
the Empire defined as “the right command without being subject to command” (quoted 
in: Riley 1976, 27) is above the sovereign power of the princes. Despite this quality of 
imperial majesty, the power of the emperor was limited by the imperial Diet and pre-
rogatives and privileges of territorial princes. (see: Leibniz 1988c, 183) The example of 
the Empire also shows why, for Leibniz, absolute sovereignty was undesirable: “in the 
Empire, subjects can plead against their princes, or their magistrates.” (Leibniz 1988c, 
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181) In other words, the existence of a higher power than that of the sovereign provides 
avenues to appeal the decisions of the direct ruler. 
      Leibniz's idea of sovereignty as mere territorial supremacy (and not the highest 
power) served to protect the rights of the lesser imperial princes in the international are-
na,10 but was rooted in the medieval understanding of political order, both internal and 
external, and in the desire to restore the Empire as a universal temporal power. (Riley 
1976, 25–26) In this sense, Lebniz's position can also be considered “out of date” (Riley 
1973, 28) or simply reactionary. Nonetheless, to the extent that he understood the Em-
pire as a multiplicity of constitutional forms existing within a larger constitutional form, 
and not mere princely patrimonies within a feudal structure of personal loyalties, his 
ideas resemble non-state federalism as well. 
      In sum, Montesquieu's federalism de-absolutizes the power of the monarch through 
territorial dispersion and independently existing institutions, undermining organ sover-
eignty, whether that of the monarch or that of the parliament. Leibniz's does the same 
but maintaining a higher temporal power over that of the sovereign. It is important to 
remember that for both Leibniz and Montesquieu, the development of the quasi-federal 
arrangements of the Empire and the Frankish kingdom under Gothic constitution was a 
process of historical devolution of power in previously more centralized polities and not 
created through a founding treaty. (respectively: Leibniz 1988c, 182; Montesquieu 
1989, passim, e.g. 31.1.670-671) In this sovereignty relativizing federalism, the federal 
principle is primarily enacted by sharing governmental functions between the center and 
regions in order to mitigate possible arbitrariness related to the concentration of power. 
In other words, it is about dispersing power and channeling its exercise through differ-
ent institutional and territorial units. Consequently, in this case the criterion of evalua-
tion of the federation is how efficiently it de-absolutizes sovereign power and mitigates 
arbitrariness. Thus, normatively, it does not matter whether a federation was created 
through decentralization or through coming together, or to what extent it does away 
with hierarchies of power. Origins are irrelevant for the federation's goals. What matters 
                                                
10 Leibniz wrote Tractatus de jure suprematus ac legationis principum Germaniae (more commonly 
known as De Suprematu Principium Germaniae or Caesarinus Fürstenerius, the latter after the pseudo-
nym under which Leibniz wrote the work), his most important work on the constitution of the Germanic 
Empire, serving as a counsellor for the Duke of Brunswick. The aim of the work was to justify the duke's 
claim to participation in Nijmegen peace negotiations from which the duke was excluded despite his 
involvement in the preceding wars. (Nijman 2005, 11) 
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is the creation of genuine checks on the center and avenues of appeal within the federa-
tion.  
 
Providing Security and Peace: Sovereignty Pooling Federalism 
Since in theory the sovereign state was released from its external obligations (save vol-
untary, hence unreliable, self-binding) and state formation proceeded through war and 
conquest, it created a competitive geopolitical environment in which the imperative of 
size influences the possibility of survival. Theorists of sovereignty pooling federalism 
have drawn from the experience of international treaty making in order to come up with 
the design of the coming together of several states that would combine not only the ad-
vantage of size with the preservation of independence but that would also make such 
arrangement sufficiently durable. The two most important theorists in this regard are 
Samuel von Pufendorf and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
      Pufendorf accepts the Bodinian-Hobbesian idea of state sovereignty as internally 
unitary and externally independent (cf. Eulau 1941, 657). Only these polities in which 
“the supreme Authority is exercis'd through all the parts of the State by one Will” (Puf-
endorf 1729, 670) can be considered regular. He dismissed the Germanic Empire, a role 
model for Leibniz, as an “irregular” and “mis-shapen Monster” (Pufendorf 2007, 179). 
The charge of irregularity applies also to Montesquieu's Gothic constitutionalism to the 
extent that its intermediary bodies split the sovereign will. Yet, Pufendorf departs from 
Hobbes (and by extension Bodin) since he believes that federations, constitutionalized 
arrangements among states which he calls systems of states,11 can mitigate instability of 
international system.12 
      The reason for entering a league is purely defensive against external threats to inde-
pendence, i.e. a possibility of war and conquest (Pufendorf 1729, 682). Systems of 
states are more than just coalitions of states. The latter are based on contingent and tem-
porary commonalities of foreign policy aims and are limited only to the mutuality of 
obligations within fulfilling these aims. The federation, by contrast, originates in a com-
                                                
11 Pufendorf distinguishes two kinds of systems: personal unions and leagues (federations). In this 
paper I am interested in the latter. 
12 It is important to note that Pufendorf departed in one important aspect from Hobbesian idea of 
sovereignty as absolute power. For the former, the creation of a state consisted of two contracts, the cont-
ract of society and the contract of government, which may result in constitutional limitations on power of 
the sovereign. 
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pact and consists of states which “are, by some special Band, so closely united, as they 
seem to compose one Body, and yet retain each of them the sovereign Command in 
their respective Dominions” (Pufendorf 1729, 681). It creates a perpetual union in 
which states oblige themselves to exercise parts of sovereignty, primarily those related 
to foreign policy, jointly with the common consent of the members of the league (Puf-
endorf 1729, 82). Conflicts between the members are supposed to be arbitrated by other 
confederates who do not have stakes in these disputes. At the same time, whatever is not 
specified in the initial compact as necessary for fulfilling the common purpose, is sup-
posed to remain within the residual powers of states. 
      Because the league originates in a compact of independent states and creates a “Un-
ion or Concurrence of Wills” rather than one superior will, Pufendorf introduces the 
requirement of unanimous decision-making (Pufendorf 1729, 684). Majority decision 
making can result in a situation in which the minority is compelled to act against its 
will. Such an outcome would undermine the purpose for which the league is established 
in the first place (to guarantee independence of federating parties). Since the initial foe-
dus constitutionalizes the relations of co-ordination among the federating states and not 
subordination, the legitimacy of collective decisions is necessarily based on consent. If 
a member persistently refuses to follow the majority and in this way endangers the 
league, sanctions are permitted; but, rather than being a form of federal intervention, 
juridically they are “the same Methods of Redress, as they who hve [sic!] in a Condition 
of natural Liberty are allow'd to use against the Violaters of Faith and Contract” (Pufen-
dorf 1729, 685), as if the federal compact with the offender were null and void. 
      Essentially, a system of states provides an institutional framework with three main 
aims: to provide security by pool resources against common external threat, to peaceful-
ly adjudicate conflicts among the federated states, and to provide equality of the states 
in governing common affairs through the principle of unanimous consent. The require-
ment of consent, however, poses the limit of the perpetuity of the union.13 Because the 
union has a very specific aim, then if “some Confederates … hope to receive more Ad-
vantage by a Separation, than they could expect under a Conjunction, and apprehend 
their Allies to be rather a Burthen to them, than as Assistance” (Pufendorf 1729, 685), 
they may voluntarily leave the union. Secession, thus, is a logical consequence of the 
                                                
13 Perpetuity of the union means that its raison d'etre in principle temporarily transcends any specific 
foreign policy goals but a universally valid goal of securing independence. 
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contractual origin of the union and its continuous existence is based on the principle of 
consent. 
      Rousseau, like Pufendorf, sees the solution to the problem of war in federal ar-
rangements. He acknowledges that the lack of uniformity and clear principles of Euro-
pean international law at the time of his writing reduces in practice the conduct between 
states to the right of the stronger and renders interstate treaties “a temporary truce rather 
than a real peace” (Rousseau 2005, 63).14 Thus, the European Federation is supposed to 
“unite nations by bonds similar to those which already unite their individual members, 
and place the one no less than the other under the authority of the Law” (Rousseau 
2005, 60). Institutionally, the European Federation of Rousseau is not that different 
from Pufendorf's system of states.15 As he specifies in the five fundamental articles of 
the union, the federation shall, first of all, originate in a compact between sovereigns. 
The legislative powers shall be vested in a Diet in which each power shall have one vote 
irrespectively of its size, power, or contributions and in which each shall in turn assume 
presidency. It shall have a federal budget to cover common expenses. Rousseau also 
says that a member state can be “put to ban” and “proscribed as public enemy” (Rous-
seau 2005, 68) if its behavior amounts to breaking the constituent treaty. 
      Where Rousseau departs from Pufendorf is the relations between the Federation and 
the constituent states. This is already visible in what the former considers the destruc-
tive behavior which includes refusal to “execute the decisions of the Alliance” (Rous-
seau 2005, 68). The decisions of the Federation can go against the will of individual 
states because Rousseau accepts majority decision making in the federal Diet (with the 
exception of amending the five articles, which requires unanimity). Additionally, alt-
hough the offender is proscribed as a public enemy, “all the Confederates shall arm and 
take the offensive … and they shall not desist until … [the offender shall have] carried 
out the decisions and order of the Diet” (Rousseau 2005, 68). Such action is in fact a 
federal intervention rather than a nullification of the contract with the offender. Addi-
tionally, despite the contractual beginning of the Federation, Rousseau denies the right 
                                                
14 This argument is an element of Rousseau's political realism which only grew with time. While he 
celebrated the plan of perpetual peace in his earlier writing, in the ones produced later he deemed it unre-
alizable. The problem was not with the project itself but with the general character of the initial argu-
ments in favor of federalism. The implementation the project requires appealing directly to specific indi-
vidual interests that particular rulers have at a particular time. (Forsyth 1981, 92) 
15 The following two paragraphs are based on the five articles of the federation. (Rousseau 2005, 68–
69) 
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to exit. Authentic federation is a “genuine Body politic” with powers to pass binding 
laws, with coercive power to enforce them, and with enough strength to make “it im-
possible for any member to withdraw at his own pleasure the moment he conceives his 
private interest to clash with that of the whole body” (Rousseau 2005, 67).16  
      Rousseau gives three reasons why such empowerment of the Federation vis-à-vis its 
members does not diminish their sovereignty. First, the members participate in collec-
tive lawmaking as equals and, as Rousseau notes, “there is all the difference in the 
world between dependence upon a rival and dependence upon a Body of which he is 
himself a member and of which each member in turn becomes a head” (Rousseau 2005, 
74). In other words, although the substance of particular decisions might contradict the 
wills of individual states at particular times, the procedure of arriving at these decisions 
was established through consent by a founding treaty. Second, further limits on the sub-
stance of decisions are imposed by the requirement of consent to change provisions of 
the founding treaty.17 Third, the body of equals protects the borders and the internal 
constitutional order of each member against the external and internal threats (these in-
cluding domestic insurrections) by entrenching these protections in the founding treaty, 
thus securing the power of incumbent princes (Rousseau 2005, 68, 71–72).  
      Nonetheless, there are important commonalities. In the case of sovereignty pooling 
federalism, the federal principle is enacted by the creation of a constitutional form aim-
ing at pooling resources necessary for common defense and acting jointly in the sphere 
of foreign policy, peacefully adjudicating conflicts among member states, while main-
taining the sovereignty of each member. This type presupposes already existing states 
that can come together. The criterion of evaluation is to what extent these possibly con-
flicting aims can be institutionally reconciled. Origins matter to the extent that they are 
logically presupposed by the aim of the federation to maintain sovereignty of its mem-
ber states. Given these aims, this type normatively implies that the consensual coming 
                                                
16 The difference between Rousseau and Pufendorf in regard to unanimity in the Diet and right of 
exit is related to the role of war in the argument of each of them. For Pufendorf war is an event that hap-
pens, an external possibility in the face of which the federation is supposed to provide security (through 
common protection if not through deterrence). For Rousseau, however, war is an existential condition of 
the state system absent of overarching enforceable law. Consequently, what needs to be eliminated are the 
conditions of possibility of war as such. 
17 This marks the fundamental difference between federal legislation and legislation within a unitary 
polity in Rousseau's thought. In the case of the latter, regular legislation and constitutional change are 
indistinguishable while the principle of unanimity clearly separates revisions of the constitutional treaty 
from the federal legislation. 
Politik  Nummer 3 | Årgang 19 | 2016 
 
 21	
together of equals will be reflected in the decision making and institutional operations 
of the federation. Foundational consent is a crucial element as it has behavioral and con-
stitutional implications, most of all equality of all parties and their equal share in the 
federal council. Moreover, this foundational consent translates into the requirement of 
unanimity at least in changing foundational constitutional articles. Thus, sovereignty in 
this type is not de-absolutized but pooled for common purposes. 
 
De-autonomizing the state: Bottom-up Federalism 
The third effect of the rise of the sovereign state is the disempowerment of the people 
vis-à-vis the ruler as a correlate of the emergence of organ sovereignty. In this regard 
the third type of federal theories responds to a similar concern as the sovereignty relativ-
izing federalism. Historically, however, the development of the third type of federal 
theory was accompanied by the early modern rebellions against these centralizing 
tendencies empowering the center at the expense of the peripheries. These theories 
emerged together with justifications of rebellion and tyrannicide. Thus, unlike the first 
type, theories of bottom-up federalism do not relativize sovereignty, but rather vest it in 
the collective body of the people, redefine it, and use as a principle to reimagine politi-
cal community. The works discussed in this section are Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos by 
Stephanus Junius Brutus, the Celt (pseudonym) (Junius Brutus, the Celt 2003), and Po-
litica Methodice Digesta by Johannes Althusius (Althusius 1995).  
      Vindiciae was written in the aftermath of the St Bartholomew's Day Massacre 
(1572) in the middle of the French religious wars and is the most famous of the Monar-
chomach tracts justifying the right of rebellion and tyrannicide. The right of resistance 
is based on Junius Brutus' conception of popular sovereignty: “the people constitutes 
kings, confers kingdoms, and approves the election by its vote” (Junius Brutus, the Celt 
2003, 68). Popular sovereignty is understood here as constituent power, i.e. the power 
of the collectivity to jointly establish its political form.18 Because the people is the sub-
ject of the constituent power and the king only a constituted power, “the whole people 
[Populus universus] is more powerful” for “one who is constituted by another is held to 
                                                
18 For the explanation of my use of the concept of constituent power, see note 5. 
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be lesser; and one who receives his authority from another is inferior to his appointer” 
(Junius Brutus, the Celt 2003, 74).  
      The act of constituting the king is described in terms of a covenant (in latin foedus) 
formalized in the exchange of oaths between the king and the people, the former pledg-
ing just rule and protection and the latter obedience. However, the oath of the people is 
conditional. The people owes the king obedience only as long as the king keeps his 
oath. Kings are constituted for a specific purpose: to deliver justice internally and com-
mand armies for external protection (Junius Brutus, the Celt 2003, 93). Effectively, the 
king is a mere supreme magistrate and not a sovereign. If the king violates the terms of 
the covenant, he commits high treason and the people may legitimately resist and force-
fully depose the tyrant (Junius Brutus, the Celt 2003, 156). Rebellion is an enactment of 
constituent power of the people. 
      It is important to note, that by the people Junius Brutus means representatives “who 
have received authority from the people – the magistrates, clearly, who are inferior to 
the king and chosen by the people, or constituted in some other way” (Junius Brutus, the 
Celt 2003, 46) and only through them popular sovereignty can be enacted. Some of the-
se magistrates, called the officers of the kingdom and the monarch's partners in rule, are 
responsible for the whole kingdom, others only for its parts (Junius Brutus, the Celt 
2003, 85–86). The duty of the latter is “to protect the people within the extent of their 
jurisdiction” (Junius Brutus, the Celt 2003, 86). If the former fail to protect the whole 
kingdom against tyranny, the latter should do it in their respective provinces. Ellen 
Meiksins Wood sees it as an indication that, under the guise of the right to rebellion, the 
Huguenots defended withering away sectional privileges of lower, provincial sectors of 
the French nobility which was highly overrepresented among the French Calvinists 
(Wood 2012, 155 and further). Irrespective of the material interest behind it, this insist-
ence on the role of provincial magistrates in protecting against tyranny led Junius Bru-
tus to understand resistance (at least partially) in terms of secession: provincial magis-
trates should vindicate “that part of the kingdom over which they have assumed tute-
lage” and “expel him (the tyrant) from their borders [fines]” (Junius Brutus, the Celt 
2003, 166).  
      Just as the general right of the people as a whole to resist the tyrant is justified by 
endowing the people with constituent power, the role of the provincial magistrates in 
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resistance against the tyrant is justified through their participation as representatives of 
provinces in the foedus with the monarch. This introduces a federal element into the 
interpretation of the French constitution by the author of Vindiciae. Magistrates of re-
gions or cities are not appointed by the king but constituted by the people of these parts 
of the kingdom (Junius Brutus, the Celt 2003, 84, cf. 46) and their duties mirror to some 
extent the duties of the king. Moreover, they represent their regions in the dealings with 
the monarch. Essentially, the kingdom as a whole is a compound polity united through 
the foedus of the people, represented as a whole by certain officers of the kingdom and 
through nobles representing its parts, with the supreme magistrate. 
      That Johannes Althusius was inspired by the tract by Junius Brutus is evident from 
frequent references to Vindiciae in Politica. In the latter work, written at a moment of 
relative peace,19 Althusius develops the bottom-up logic of federalism, incipient in Vin-
diciae, much further. It is already clear in his definition of politics as “the art of associ-
ating (consociandi) men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating, and conserving 
social life among them” (Althusius 1995, 17). He adds that “the efficient cause of poli-
tics is consent and agreement among communicating citizens” (Althusius 1995, 24). 
The emphasis on pledges given by the associates, tellingly called “symbiotes,” to each 
other privileges horizontal relations over the vertical ones. Coming together is the very 
core around which his theory of politics is built. The process of associating unfolds in a 
consensual creation of communities, from a nuclear family to a universal common-
wealth as the “human society develops from private to public association by the definite 
steps and progressions of small societies” (Althusius 1995, 39). In this process, smaller 
associations are creators and members of more comprehensive ones, and despite succes-
sive unions they maintain their integrity. At each step, the principle of governing the 
association is the same: the elected leader of the association is its administrator, is 
bound by the oath to attend to the welfare of the association, and is superior to each in-
dividual member but inferior to the association as a whole (e.g. Althusius 1995, 16, 41–
                                                
19 The first edition of Politica was published in 1603, after de facto (not yet de jure) success of the 
Dutch Revolt against the Spanish Hapsburgs (1585) and the conclusion of the French Wars of Religion 
(1598) but before the beginning of the Thirty Years' War (1618). The revised second and third editions 
were published in 1610 and 1614, respectively. This might explain why Politica in comparison to Vindi-
ciae has much more systematic structure of a juridico-political treatise than a pamphlet. 
 The citations are from the abridged english translation of the third edition.  
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42, 122).20 In each case, it is justified by the primacy of the constituting over the consti-
tuted, i.e. the principle of constituent power. 
      This formal definition of politics is developed into a grand design of a polity. In this 
design, Althusius distinguishes between private and public associations. The latter are 
constituted when the plurality of private associations (families, kinship groups, and col-
legia) living in the same place decides to associate and be governed by the same set of 
laws; the individual persons comprising the private associations that form the public 
association become its citizens (Althusius 1995, 39–40). These small communities 
(hamlets, villages, towns, and cities) associate into provinces; provinces in turn associ-
ate into a universal commonwealth. At the level of the province, less comprehensive 
associations are represented as members in provincial estates (Althusius 1995, 60). This 
structure is reproduced at the level of the commonwealth; it is supplemented, however, 
by the offices of ephors who resemble Junius Brutus' officers of the kingdom. The peo-
ple through their representatives elect ephors who in turn elect the supreme magistrate. 
Ephors assist the supreme magistrate in fulfilling his obligations; in the case of attempts 
at tyranny they are supposed to lead resistance – general ephors at the level of the com-
monwealth and special ephors within territories entrusted to them. 
      Althusius expands the notions of federalism and popular sovereignty present in Vin-
diciae. Regarding the former, Althusius' design is not static but dynamic: the common-
wealth is constituted through a series of acts of association initiated at the bottom, each 
subsequent act being an iteration of the first one on a larger scale. Just like Junius Bru-
tus, he locates sovereignty in the people and understands it as constituent power (Elazar 
1995, xlii; Hueglin 1999, 150), but he goes beyond Vindiciae in two respects. First, he 
extends the principle of constituent power to each act of associating since on each level 
more comprehensive associations depend on the consent on their constituents. For this 
reason he admits secession not only in the case of tyranny but also if a province does 
not benefit from the membership in the commonwealth (Althusius 1995, 197). Second, 
and related to the right of resistance: while following Junius Brutus he denies private 
individuals the right of rebellion, he nonetheless allows for the election of ad hoc ephors 
                                                
20 The exception here is the head of the province as a member of the universal commonwealth, who 
is appointed by the supreme magistrate. Thomas Hueglin attributes this deviation from the principle to the 
political conflict Althusius was involved in as a syndic of Emden between the city and the count of Easter 
Frisia (see: Hueglin 1999, 36). 
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to organize resistance (Althusius 1995, 195). As Thomas Hueglin accurately puts it: 
Althusius' federalism “means pluralization of governance among members of a com-
monwealth wherein all higher levels of authority are as a matter of principle constituted 
on the basis of consent and solidarity from below” (Hueglin 1999, 153). The effect is a 
bottom-up constituted multilevel structure of increasingly comprehensive associations 
in which more comprehensive associations are constituted by but do not exhaust less 
comprehensive ones. Nonetheless, despite these differences, in both Vindiciae and Po-
litica, the federal principle is associated with popular sovereignty understood as constit-
uent power and implies the bottom-up constitution of a compound polity. Additionally, 
in both cases rebellion is understood as secession and justified in terms of the primacy 
of the constituent over the constituted. In both cases central power normatively and log-
ically depends on the coming together of smaller territorial units with independent 
source of legitimacy. 
      To sum up, in the case of bottom-up federalism, the federal principle is manifested 
in the bottom-up coming together of different groups as a means of constituting more 
comprehensive associations, which nonetheless are dependent on the less comprehen-
sive ones. While similar to the founding foedus of the second type, this one is not lim-
ited to sovereign states but can include other political forms, like compound ones. The 
reason for this is that, unlike in the second type, sovereignty is not vested in each mem-
ber separately and pooled, but jointly in all as constituent power. In this case, origins are 
fundamental, because they are the criterion of evaluation. Normatively, then, it implies 
the necessity of preserving the principles of the founding in the juridico-political struc-




In the previous sections I presented three ideal types of federal theory as responses to 
the effects of the early modern development of the state and the corresponding absolut-
ist theory of state sovereignty. In the case of each type, federation is a political form 
different from and an alternative to the sovereign state. Nonetheless, in each case, the 
federal principle of self- and shared rule is manifested differently. These differences 
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matter to the extent that they inform us about the criteria of evaluation for federal ar-
rangements and normative implications of each of the types. 
      There are at least two major stakes in this reconstruction. First, showing the early 
modern alternative to the state denaturalizes the political form of the state. The state has 
not simply developed from pre-modern forms of political organization. The proponents 
of the state won ideological and political struggles not only against the European ancien 
régime but also against proponents of alternative political forms. Presenting its early 
modern competitor (or, rather, competitors – about this in a moment) undermines the 
obviousness of the state, whether unitary of federal, whether standing alone or in alli-
ance with others. Additionally, it opens up space for new questions, not only concerning 
how the alternatives were crowded out21 but also about the alternative itself. For exam-
ple, investigated as “the path not taken” federation can serve as a basis for a normative 
critique of the state. It repoliticizes federalism, elevating it from the issue of administra-
tive arrangements to issue of the political form, or, in other words, from a technical 
question to a question of the political principle. 
      The second stake has to do with the diversity of federal theories, specifically – the 
differences regarding the manifestation of federal principle, the criterion of evaluation, 
and the normative implications. Sovereignty relativizing federalism, as it is concerned 
with mitigating the power of the center, in a charitable reading is compatible with a lib-
eral polity defending individual rights at the expense of not only central government but 
also popular participation, not unlike the American federation envisioned by the Found-
ing Fathers (cf. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 2003, The Federalist no. 10 and no. 63). In 
a more critical reading, it dangerously closely approaches an imperial formation. Sover-
eignty pooling federalism, concerned mainly with providing security for and maintain-
ing sovereignty of the member states, is compatible with the conservative features of the 
German Bund, a union of monarchical states united in their aim to preserve the privileg-
es of the rulers (cf. Forsyth 1981). Bottom-up federalism, by contrast, stressing the bot-
tom-up process of federating and dependence of the higher level authorities on the low-
er level communities, seems more compatible with the multilayered system of wards 
                                                
21 Even such insightful works on the development of the modern state like the ones by Gianfranco 
Poggi (1978), Tilly, or Jordan Branch (2014) answer only the question how the state was built against the 
pre-modern arrangements. The question how and why it defeated other political forms is rarely addressed 
– a notable exception here is Spruyt (1996). 
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envisioned by Jefferson (1999) or Condorcet's (1976) constitutional proposal consisting 
of multiple levels and loci of participation. At the same time, first two types seem in 
principle much more stable than the rebellious third one. This diversity of federal ar-
rangements introduces additional political question: not only either the state or federal-
ism, but also which federalism. Thus, recovery of early modern theories federalism not 
only can enrich our thinking of federalism beyond the dominant dichotomy federal 
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